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PRE-HIRE AGREEMENTS AND SECTION 8(f) OF THE NLRA:
STRIKING A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN EMPLOYEE
FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY STABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Many construction industry employers hire employees, as the need
arises, to work on a particular project and to be laid off when their
services are no longer required.' Most construction workers are orga-
nized into union hiring halls.2 A hiring hall, or work referral system,
is an arrangement under which a union that "has control of or access
to a particular labor pool agrees to supply workers to an employer
upon request." 3  When an employer in the construction industry
needs skilled workers for a project, he often seeks such workers from
the union hiring hall.
4
Historically, the practice in the construction industry was for the
employer to sign an agreement with the hiring hall union which set
the terms and conditions of employment for workers not yet hired. 5
1. S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1952); A. Goldman, The Supreme
Court and Labor-Management Relations Law 165 (1976); see R. Gorman, Basic Text
on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining 664 (1976) ("an electrical
subcontractor in the construction business may have no regular employee force but
rather seek qualified electricians to go to the jobsite on one date to install wires across
the studded substructure of the house and will later send electricians (not always the
same ones) back after the walls have been completed in order to install switchplates
and fixtures").
2. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345; Fleming, Title VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw.
L. Rev. 666, 702-03 (1960); see S. Rep. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); 105
Cong. Rec. 8874 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 1750 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Legislative
History]; Strasser, Compensation in the Construction Industry, Monthly Lab. Rev.,
May 1970, at 64, 64-65.
3. Labor Management Serv. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Exclusive Union
Work Referral Systems in the Building Trades 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Referral
Systems].
4. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2344-45; S. Rep.
No. 1211, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 664; Referral
Systems, supra note 3, at 1-3; Fleming, supra note 2, at 703.
5. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); see S. Rep. No. 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2344; H.R.
Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2424, 2442; 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 1577; Referral Systems, supra note 3, at 1-10.
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These contracts, known as pre-hire agreements, 6 often contemplated a
tenure of years, spanning several projects. 7  Rather than having to
renegotiate the terms and conditions of employment on each new
project, the employer was assured a ready supply of skilled workers
and predictable labor costs upon which to base his bids on projects
subcontracted by a general contractor. 8 Furthermore, the construc-
tion worker had the benefit of a central clearinghouse for employment
opportunities. 9
Generally, a union must be approved as the bargaining representa-
tive by a majority of employees10 before the union and the employer
may contract." If a union demonstrates majority support, the em-
6. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1978); Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635
F.2d 859, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Referral
Systems, supra note 3, at 16.
7. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2344; H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in
1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2442; S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1952); 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 1578; see Eastern Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
Blake Constr. Co., 457 F. Supp. 825, 829 (E.D. Va. 1978).
8. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Local No. 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Irvin,
475 F.2d 1265, 1267 (3d Cir. 1973); S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2344-45; H.R. Rep. No. 741,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2442;
S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1952); Hearings on S. 1973, Before the
Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 32 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 1973]; Fleming, supra note 2, at 702.
9. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Local No. 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hearings on S.
1973, supra note 8, at 32, 47; Fleming, supra note 2, at 702-03; see S. Rep. No. 1509,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
10. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The statute
provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through represent-
atives of their own choosing." Id. In ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), the
Supreme Court found that when an employer had granted exclusive bargaining
status to an agent selected by a minority of his employees, there existed a clear
"abridgement of § 7 [rights] of the Act." Id. at 737. The right of employees to choose
their own bargaining representative has been referred to as the "most sacrosanct of
all" rights conferred by the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Haberman
Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 312 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 641
F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); accord NLRB v. Shawnee Plasties, Inc., 492 F.2d 869, 871
(6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Schmerler Ford, Inc. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970).
11. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961); Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp. v.
NLRB, 625 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Komatz Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d
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ployer may voluntarily recognize the union as bargaining representa-
tive.' 2 If the employer refuses to recognize the union, the union may
petition the National Labor Relations Board (Board) for certification
through a representation election' 3 and, once certified, can compel
the employer to bargain.14 Certifying a union as bargaining repre-
sentative requires the filing of a petition for an election with the
regional office of the Board, review of that petition by the regional
office, a secret ballot of employees, and certification of the election by
the regional office.15
The periods of employment in the construction industry are often so
short, 16 however, that it is impracticable to complete the process of
certifying a collective bargaining representative before a project ends
and the employees are laid off.17 Furthermore, if an employer recog-
317, 322-23 (8th Cir. 1972); Goldfarb v. Service Motor Freight, Inc., 438 F. Supp.
18, 22-23 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). An employer may voluntarily recognize a union that has
been "designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). If the employer refuses to recognize the
union, the employees or union may petition for an election to certify the union as
collective bargaining agent. Id. § 159(c). If the employer contracts with a union that
has support from only a minority of his employees, he will have committed the unfair
labor practices of interfering with the employees' right to select a collective bargain-
ing representative, see Id. § 158(a)(1), and illegally assisting a union. See Id. §
158(a)(2).
12. See NLRB v. Newport Div. of Wintex Knitting Mills, Inc., 610 F.2d 430, 431
(6th Cir. 1979); Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1977):
American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1969); District 50,
UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 570 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1976); see, e.g., NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc.,
613 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Sumter
Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 919 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092
(1977). The Board may compel the employer to bargain with a union without an
election when the employer's unfair labor practices have made the holding of a fair
election unlikely. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969); United
Dairy Farmers Coop Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1980); NLRB
v. Dadco Fashions, Inc., 632 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1980).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See generally, R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 40-
41; C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 153-55 (1971).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1). See generally R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 40-41;
C. Morris, supra note 14, at 153-55.
16. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Trustees of the Atlanta Iron
Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971); S.
Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2318, 2344; H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2442; Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 8, at 33;
A. Goldman, supra note 1, at 165; R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 664; Referral
Systems, supra note 3, at 1.
17. NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds en banc, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Trustees of the Atlanta Iron
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nizes a union as bargaining representative of his employees, but the
union is not in fact supported by a majority of his employees, the
employer has committed the unfair labor practice of illegally assisting
a union"' in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).19 Pre-hire agreements, therefore, technically con-
stituted illegal assistance of a union by the employer because agree-
ments were signed prior to the union attaining majority status, indeed
before the employer had even hired any employees.20
The General Counsel for the Board recognized the need of the
construction industry to have a skilled work force available for quick
referral2' and adopted a policy of not issuing complaints against con-
struction employers and unions entering into pre-hire agreements. 2
Finally in 1959, Congress legitimized pre-hire agreements by enacting
section 8(f) of the NLRA. 3 Section 8(f) provides that an employment
Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Vire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971); S.
Rep. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1954); 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1577-78: 105 Cong. Rec. 8874
(1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1750.
18. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961); Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp. v.
NLRB, 625 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1980); Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Goldfarb v. Service
Motor Freight, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
20. Chicago Freight Car & Parts Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1165 (1949); S. Rep.
No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2318, 2344; H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2442; Fleming, supra note 2, at 702.
21. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345; S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952); R. Gorman,
supra note 1, at 664; Referral Systems, supra note 3, at 11; Fleming, supra note 2, at
702,-03.
22. S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1952); Hearings on S. 1973, supra
note 8, at 36; 105 Cong. Rec. 8874 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 1750. Shortly after the General Counsel's announcement that he would not
issue complaints for the practice of entering into pre-hire agreements, the Board
issued a statement that it would still enforce the existing law '[i]f and when .. .any
such case reaches the Board members." Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 8, at 36.
When private parties complained to the Board of pre-hire agreements, the Board
found the agreements illegal. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 143, 146 (1950),
enforcement denied, 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952); Chicago Freight Car & Parts Co.,
83 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1165 (1949).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). Section 8(f) provides: "It shall not be an unfair
labor practice... for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construc-
tion industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor
organization of which building and construction employees are members ... be-
cause (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established...
prior to the making of such agreement ... : Providedfurther, That any agreement
which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a
petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title." Id. (emphasis in
original).
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contract between a union and an employer in the construction indus-
try does not constitute an unfair labor practice merely because union
majority among the employer's employees has not yet been attained.2 4
Creation of a pre-hire agreement requires the volition of only the
employer and the union.25 Congressional debates preceeding enact-
ment of section 8(f) addressed the concern that allowing an employer
to contract unilaterally with a union that will act on behalf of pro-
spective employees may compromise the right of employees to select
their own bargaining representative. 2  It was observed, however,
that most employees in the construction industry are organized into
union hiring halls.2 7 Therefore, an employer, having contracted with
the union, will hire his work force through the union hiring hall. 28
Because members of the hiring hall are generally union members,
majority support for the union among employees eventually hired is
assured.29 Furthermore, Congress sought to guarantee the employees'
freedom of choice by including a final proviso to section 8(f). 3 0 The
final proviso permits the employees or a rival union that believes the
hiring hall union does not have majority support among the employ-
er's employees to challenge a pre-hire agreement at any time by
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976); see, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978);
Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1981); Contractors
Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir.
1981).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
26. 105 Cong. Rec. 10,104 (1959) ("[t]he fundamental criticism of this amend-
ment is that it destroys the basic right which the Taft-[Hartley] Act, and the Wagner
Act before it, grants to employees-the right to be represented by a collective-
bargaining agent of their own choosing"), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 1289; 105 Cong. Rec. 6431 (1959) ("we should not place the unions in the
building and construction field in a position of special privilege, at the expense of the
employees in that industry"), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at
1082; 105 Cong. Rec. 6416 (1959) ("[t]he protection of the liberty of the worker [may
be] completely eliminated [by this bill]"), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 1075.
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345. The union is viewed as an employment agency that Is
retained by the employer. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667,
672-73 (1961); see NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304-05 (5th Cir,
1980), rev'd on other grounds en bane, 641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Local No. 150,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
29. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345; see S. Rep. No. 1211, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954).
30. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied
sub nom. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1973); 105 Cong. Rec. 15,542 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History,
supra note 2, at 1587.
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petitioning the Board to decertify the union.3' An ordinary collective
bargaining agreement is protected from such a challenge for a period
of up to three years by the contract bar rule. 2  The contract bar rule
exempts a union from challenge by a petition by employees or a rival
union for a decertification election unless the petition is filed three
years after the execution of the collective bargaining agreement or
during a thirty day "open period" commencing three months before
the expiration of the agreement, whichever occurs first.33 By protect-
ing most collective bargaining agreements for their term, the contract
bar rule stabilizes labor relations. 34 Nevertheless, section 8(f), with
its final proviso, reflects the desire of Congress to strike a proper
balance between the unique needs of the construction industry and
the protection of the employees' right to choose their own bargaining
representative. 35
The Board, empowered to decide issues of statutory construction
arising under federal labor statutes,36 has construed section 8(f) to
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976); see, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, lnt'l
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978);
NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 364 (5th Cir. 1981); Precision
Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1981). Ruttmann Constr. Co.,
191 N.L.R.B. 701, 703 (1971) (Member Fanning, concurring). The final proviso
states, "any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of [section 8(f)],
shall not be a bar to a petition." 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). Section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) of
the NLRA provides that a petition for a representation election may be filed when
the labor organization that has been recognized or certified as bargaining representa-
tive does not have the support of a majority of employees. Id. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii)
(1976).
32. Westwood Import Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1222 (1980); General Cable
Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). If the agreement exceeds three years, the
contract bar rule protects it only for the first three y'ears. Id.; Malco Theatres, Inc.,
222 N.L.R.B. 81, 82 n.6 (1976); Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B.
766, 767-68 (1975).
33. Westwood Import Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1222 (1980); Union Carbide
Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 191, 191 (1971); see General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123,
1128 n.16 (1962).
34. Westwood Import Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1222 (1980); Youngstown Osteo-
pathic Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.L.R.B. 766, 768 (1975); General Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
35. 105 Cong. Rec. 15,542 (1959) ("the committee bill authorizes the pre-hire
contracts but preserves freedom of choice. . . by a proviso which expressly states
that the pre-hire agreement shall not be a bar to a petition for an election"),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1578; see NLRB v. Local Union
No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335,
348-49 (1978); NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 364 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en bane); R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement
denied sub nom. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
36. See Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307,
1982] 1019
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allow construction industry employers to utilize pre-hire agreements
regardless of whether they employ a stable work force on a full time
basis or only temporary workers for a particular project.37  Further-
more, it has broadly construed the final proviso of section 8(f) so that
either the employer or union may repudiate pre-hire agreements at
will. 38 This Note contends that the Board's construction of section
8(f) leads to results that are inconsistent with the intent of Congress
underlying enactment of section 8(f) and repugnant to basic precepts
of the National Labor Relations Act. Protection of the right of em-
ployees to choose their own bargaining representative requires that
the use of pre-hire agreements be restricted to those construction
industry employers who actually hire from union hiring halls. Fur-
thermore, assurance of stable labor relations in the construction indus-
try requires that pre-hire agreements be enforceable for their term
absent a petition filed pursuant to the final proviso.
I. PRE-nnE AGREEMENTS AND STABLE WoRK FORCE EMPLOYERS
The Board has interpreted section 8(f) as permitting a stable work
force employer in the construction industry to contract with a union
that has not been approved as the bargaining representative by a
1316 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Rosen v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 615, 617 (3d Cir. 1972); R.
Gorman, supra note 1, at 13. See generally Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4
(1945) (Board construes meaning of statutory term "foreman"); Hearst Publications,
39 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1942) (same for term "employee"), rev'd, 136 F.2d 608 (9th Cir.
1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
37. See, e.g., Land Equip. Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685 (1980) (stable work force);
Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169 (1979) (stable work force), enforcement
denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981); Haberman Constr. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 79
(1978) (project-by-project), enforced, 618 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd en bane,
641 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421
(1977) (project-by-project); Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structual &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975) (project-by-project), enforce-
ment denied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 335 (1978); R.J. Smith
Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971) (stable work force), enforcement denied sub
nom. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
38. See, e.g., Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 422 (1977) ("the
[employer] was under no obligation to adhere to its agreement"); Local Union No.
103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45,
46 (1975) ("[e]mployer could have terminated the agreement with [the union] for
projects not yet underway"), enforcement denied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 434 U.S. 335 (1978). This construction has been criticized as contrary to
legislative intent. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d
1186, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1973);
King & LaVaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Relations-The
Double-Breasted Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 901, 940
(1978). See generally, Note, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industry: Empty
Promises or Enforceable Rights?, 81 Columbia L. Rev. 1702 (1981).
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majority of the employer's employees. 9 An employer is deemed a
stable work force employer if his employees are hired and retained on
a long-term basis. 40  Generally, an employer of a stable work force
will enter into a pre-hire agreement to satisfy a general contractor's
precondition to the award of a project contract that the employees be
unionized. 4' This precondition may be imposed because the general
contractor's own workers are unionized and will strike if a non-union
subcontractor is awarded a contract. 42  Under the Board's present
construction of section 8(f), this use of pre-hire agreements is appro-
priate and does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 43
The Board's approval of the use of pre-hire agreements by stable
work force employers is inconsistent with congressional intent under-
lying section 8(f) and permits an employer to impose a union on
unconsenting employees. 44 Congress enacted section 8(f) for the ben-
efit of employers who hire employees from a hiring hall at the start of
a project and lay them off at the project's termination. 45  The express
39. Hageman Underground Constr. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 62 (1980); Land
Equip., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685, 688 (1980); Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B.
169, 169 (1979), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981); R.J. Smith
Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied sub nora. Local No.
150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40. E.g., Hageman Underground Constr. Co., 2053 N.L.R.B. 60, 62 (1980) ("Re-
spondent utilized a permanent and stable group of backhoe operators and did not
generally hire on a project-by-project basis."): Land Equip., Inc.. 248 N.L.R.B. 6S5,
685 n.2 (1980) ("Respondent ... has a relatively stable complement of employees
who move from job to job and who work between jobs in the Respondent's yard."):
Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169, 169 (1979) ("Respondent employed a
permanent complement of workers, who moved from site to site." (footnote omit-
ted)), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. E.g., Irvin-McKelvy Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 52 (1971) ("[Tjhese employees
were not represented for collective-bargaining purposes by any labor organiza-
tion ... [and] it became necessary for [the employer] to recognize [a union] in order
to obtain work. Accordingly ... [the employer] signed a collective-bargaining
agreement with [the union]."), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973);
Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971) ("as a condition to acceptance
of the contract, [the employer] had to apply the [pre-hire agreement]").
42. See Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 (1971) ('" 'contractor shall
perform all labor with workers who are either members of the local . . .union at the
work site or with workers whose union membership will not othervise disturb [the]
Owner's labor relations with [his] workers' " (quoting project contract)).
43. Land Equip., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685, 689 (1980); Irvin-McKelv Co., 194
N.L.R.B. 52, 53 (1971), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973); Rutt-
mann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971); see R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 694-95 (1971), enforcement denied sub noin. Local No. 150, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
44. See Irvin-McKelvy Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 60-61 (1971) (adopting in part and
modifying in part trial examiner's decision (Feb. 19, 1970)), enforcement denied, 475
F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2344; S. Rep. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1954);
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purpose for making pre-hire agreements available to the construction
industry was to facilitate the efficient use of a construction labor
clearinghouse made necessary by the intermittent nature of the indus-
try's employment relationships. 46 A construction worker typically
works for many different employers rather than any one employer
continuously. 47 Efficient hiring can be achieved through an agree-
ment between an employer and a union hiring hall specifying the
terms and conditions of employment for employees not yet hired."8
The stable work force employer, however, because he retains his
S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1952); 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 1577-78. Commentators have
uniformly discussed § 8(f) in terms of the project-by-project employer and hiring hall
union relationship. A. Goldman, supra note 1, at 165-66; R. Gorman, supra note 1,
at 668; T. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts: A Legal
Analysis of Union Security Agreements 105 (1977); Referral Systems, supra note 3, at
16-17; Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act oJ 1959. 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1122-23 (1960); Fleming, supra note 2, at 702-08. During
Congressional discussion preceeding enactment of § 8(f), it was observed that ascer-
taining whether an employer is engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry, and therefore eligible to utilize § 8(f), could prove difficult. S. Rep. No.
1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952); Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 8, at 54-55, 69-
71; Fleming, supra note 2, at 707. The resolution reached by the legislators was that
§ 8(f) should be applicable when the construction workers are hired on a temporary,
project-by-project basis. S. Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952); Hearings on
S. 1973, supra note 8, at 71-72.
46. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2344-45; H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, re-
printed in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2442. The unions' and employ-
ers' objective "to clearly legalize agreements providing for exclusive union work
referral systems ...[was] attained in 1959 with the passage of . . .section 8(f)."
Referral Systems, supra note 3, at 16-17; accord R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 668; T.
Haggard, supra note 45, at 105.
47. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2344; H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in
1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2424, 2441-42; Fleming, supra note 2, at 702.
48. Prior to the enactment of § 8(f), the Board struck down pre-hire agreements
becauie they constituted an unfair labor practice. See supra note 22. Principals of the
construction industry feared that the inability of construction contractors and unions
to enter into contracts prior to actual hiring would throw the industry into chaos. S.
Rep. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952); Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 8, at
37, 47. Because the construction industry employer needs to know his labor costs
prior to making a bid on a project, S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318, 2344-45; Hearings on S. 1973,
supra note 8, at 30, 48, and to be assured a ready supply of skilled labor, S. Rep. No.
187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess, 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2318,
2345; Hearings on S. 1973, supra note 8, at 32, 48; Fleming, supra note 2, at 702, it
was apparent that the stability of the industry depended on making valid pre-hire
agreements available. See Local Union No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1973); R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 695-96 (1971) (Members Fanning and Brown, dissenting), enjorce-
ment denied sub norn. Local Union No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
NLRB, 480 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fleming, supra note 2, at 702-03.
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employees, has no need to utilize the union hiring hall as a clearing-
house for laborers.
Use of pre-hire agreements by stable work force employers not only
fails to advance this intended purpose of section 8(f) but allows the
employer to impose a union as bargaining representative upon his
employees, irrespective of their wishes. A fundamental protection of
employees' rights under the NLRA is the rule that a union must be
designated or selected by a majority of an employer's employees be-
fore it may act as collective bargaining representative. 40 Section 8(f)
has been construed to be only a narrow exception to that protec-
tion. 50 In an early section 8(f) case s ' in which an employer with a
stable work force entered into a pre-hire agreement with a union, an
administrative law judge found section 8(f) inapplicable because Con-
gress envisioned that pre-hire agreements be utilized in a setting
where employment relationships are of such brief duration that it is
imposible to hold a representation election. -52 Because in this case it
was feasible to hold an election and ascertain the employees' prefer-
ence, the employer was found guilty of illegally assisting the union.53
The Board reversed this portion of the holding without discussion and
has consistently adhered to its position. A union and an employer are
therefore empowered to circumvent the usual certification process
49. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1066 (3d Cir.
1980) ("A basic purpose of the Act is to protect the selection of union bargaining
representatives by a majority of the employees in a free and uncoerced manner.");
NLRB v. Shawnee Plastics, Inc., 492 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir.) ("The paramount
purpose of the Act is to secure to the employees freedom of choice in their representa-
tives."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 238 (1974); Schmerler Ford, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d
1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1970) ("The Act establishes a strong public policy favoring the
free choice of a bargaining agent by employees .... ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823
(1970).
50. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978); Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v.
Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 364 (5th Cir. 1981): Trustees of the Atlanta
Iron Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1097, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Irvin-McKelvy Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 60 (1971),
enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973).
51. Irvin-McKelvy Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 56 (1971) (adopting in part and modi-
fying in part trial examiner's decision (Feb. 19, 1970)), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 60 ("[T]he Respondent here had a 'stable working force' and merely
desired to change the collective-bargaining representative of such force from one
union to another so that he would be able to qualify for contracting work .... I
find and conclude that Section 8(f) was not written to accomplish such purpose and
that, under the circumstances extant in the instant case, Respondent was bound
to . . . have the representation question established through procedures prescribed in
Section 9 of the Act." (footnotes omitted)).
53. Id.
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and sign an agreement regarding the terms of employment on behalf
of non-consenting employees.5 4
Congress, in enacting section 8(f), believed that pre-hire agree-
ments constituted a proper exception to the requirement of majority
designation or certification of a union because
[a] substantial majority of the skilled employees in this industry
constitute a pool of ... help centered about their appropriate
craft union. If the employer relies upon this pool of skilled crafts-
men, members of the union, there is no doubt under these circum-
stances that the union will in fact represent a majority of the
employees eventually hired.55
This presumption does not apply to a stable work force employer
because the employer, rather than hiring from a union hiring hall,
merely contracts with a union that then acts on behalf of employees
already retained by the employer., 6 Stable work force employees
who are dissatisfied with the union chosen for them may petition the
Board for decertification of the union pursuant to the final proviso of
section 8(f) .5  This remedy, however, is unsatisfactory because as an
administrative law judge noted, "these employees might be subjected
to the imposition of [many] different unions per year . . . and be put
to the responsibility of petitioning the Board... , a situation clearly
not contemplated by Congress. 581
The potential of actually thwarting the employees' freedom to
choose a bargaining representative is heightened when pre-hire agree-
ments contain a union security clause. 59 A union security clause, on
its face, typically requires that all employees become members of the
union within a specified period of time.60 Union security clauses,
54. Id. at 53. Member Fanning noted the inequity of the unilateral action by the
employer of ceasing to recognize one union and recognizing another as the collective-
bargaining representative of this stable employee group. He agreed with the trial
examiner's ruling that the union had been illegally assisted. Id. at 54-55 (Member
Fanning, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
55. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345.
56. See supra notes 39-40.
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
58. Irvin-McKelvy Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 60 n.17 (1971), enforcement denied,
475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. Pre-hire agreements frequently contain union security clauses. See Land
Equip., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685, 686 (1980); Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B.
169, 169 (1979), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1980); Irvin-McKelvy
Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 52 (1971), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1973);
R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 693 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom.
Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
60. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) 87:62-63
(1978); R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 642.
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regardless of their terms, may require only that an employee tender
union dues; they cannot require actual union membershipY'
Nonetheless, the average worker, unschooled in the law, assumes that
this clause requires formal membership in the union.62 It is, there-
fore, recognized that a union security clause effectively compels em-
ployees to become members of the union.63  Consequently, union
membership under a union security clause is not an accurate indica-
tion of union support.6 4 The Board has developed a rule, however,
that a union that has attained majority membership by means of a
union security clause in a pre-hire agreement is entitled to an irrebut-
table presumption of continued majority status.65  This presumption
exempts the union from being challenged under the final proviso of
section 8(f), which permits the filing of a petition for decertification
on the grounds of a lack of majority support for the union, and
therefore protects the pre-hire agreement by means of a contract
61. Local 749, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers. 192 N.L.R.B. 502, 510 (1971), en-
forced, 466 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 410 U.S. 926 (1973): Union
Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 784-87 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951): R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 640: see C.
Morris, supra note 14, at 701.
62. T. Haggard, supra note 45, at 70. At least one court, recognizing this
problem, ordered the employer to notify employees that the extent of their obligation
was to tender fees and dues. Marden v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 78 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 11,412 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd in part and remanded, 576 F.2d 576 (5th
Cir. 1978). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the language of the agreement
was misleading, but held that the point was moot, and the injunctive relief was
withdrawn. 576 F.2d at 581-82.
63. Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1981):
NLRB v. Forest City/Dillon-Tecon Pacific, 522 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1981);
Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979); see Teamsters Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1389-90
(D.C. Cir. 1976). The Board has held, analogously, that the mere fact that a
majority of employees in a unit authorize the employer to deduct their union dues
directly from their pay, pursuant to a dues check-off provision, does not necessarily
indicate majority support for the union, and in a proper case, an employer may
refuse to recognize such a union. Id. at 1389-90; see, e.g., Mitchell Standard Corp.,
140 N.L.R.B. 496, 499-500 (1963): Randall Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 289, 294-96
(1961).
65. Hageman Underground Constr. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 62 n.9 (1980) ("a
union that establishes majority status in a permanent and stable unit becomes the
9(a) bargaining representative for the employees in that unit and is entitled to an
irrebuttable presumption of majority status for the remainder of the collective-
bargaining agreement"); see N.L.R.B. v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 367
(5th Cir. 1981); Land Equip., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 n.2 (1980), enforced, 108
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2175 (9th Cir. 1981); Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169,
170 (1979), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981).
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bar.66 In Precision Striping, Inc., 67 for example, an employer selected
a union for his stable work force of employees.68 He signed a pre-hire
agreement that included a union security clause. A majority of his
employees ultimately joined the union pursuant to the union security
clause. The employer later polled his employees to ascertain their
support for the union and, finding that they opposed the union,
repudiated the pre-hire agreement. 69 The Board held that one-time
66. In Hageman Underground Constr. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 60 (1980), the Board
stated that upon gaining majority status under a pre-hire agreement in a stable work
force, the union is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of majority, as would be
the case in an ordinary industrial setting. Id. at 63. The Board in Hageinan, id. at 62
n.8, cited to Hexter Furniture Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 342 (1955), which explained, "the
Board has formulated a number of rules for determining the circumstances under
which it will entertain petitions to displace an incumbent bargaining representa-
tive . . . . The most important of these rules is that, in the absence of certain
circumstances. . . the Board will not entertain a representation petition seeking a
new determination of the employees' bargaining representative during the middle
period of a valid outstanding collective-bargaining agreement of reasonable dura-
tion." Id. at 343-44. Even more destructive of employee freedom of choice is the
Board's rule that when an employer enters a pre-hire agreement and joins a multi-
employer bargaining group, the relevant bargaining unit is the entire multi-employer
bargaining group. Amado Elec., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 37, 37 n.1 (1978) (Members
Panello and Murphy, concurring); Authorized Air Conditioning Co., 236 N.L.R.B.
131, 131 n.2 (1978). A multi-employer bargaining group is a group of employers
joined together for the purpose of bargaining as a unit with unions that represent all
of the employers' employees. See R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 86-87; C. Morris,
supra note 14, at 236-41. Thus, even when no employees of a particular employer
have joined the union they may be bound by the agreement if the employer has
joined a multi-employer group, since ordinarily such a group has sufficient numbers
and majority status to offset the non-support of one employer's employees. Amado
Elec., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 37, 37 n.1 (1978) ("even had the General Counsel failed to
show that the Union represented a majority of [the employer's] employees, [the
employer] would not be free to repudiate the agreement because [the employer] was
a member of a multiemployer bargaining association"), Authorized Air Conditioning
Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 131, 131 n.2 (1978) ("the representative status of the Union
among [the employer's] employees is immaterial as those employees constitute only a
small segment of the appropriate unit"). One court recognized the inequity of em-
powering the union and the employer to dictate the collective bargaining agent to the
employees in this way, and held that an employer may riot unilaterally join a multi-
employer group under a pre-hire agreement unless he receives his employees' sup-
port. Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co., 657
F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We cannot accept the simultaneous and mutual
bootstrapping of these two principles inherent in the court's conclusions: that the
employer joined the [multi-employer group] and that the prehire agreements conse-
quently became enforceable contracts without any finding that the [employer's]
employees assented to these developments.").
67. 245 N.L.R.B. 169 (1979), enforcement denied, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.
1981).
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id.
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majority support for the union in a stable work force creates an
irrebuttable presumption of continued majority. 70 Thus, the employ-
ees were saddled with a union even though they clearly evidenced
their desire to reject the union. 7'
The final proviso of section 8(f) was intended to prevent employees
from being bound by a labor contract negotiated by a union they did
not select. 72 The Board's construction of section 8(f) permits employ-
ers to enter into agreements that effectively cause the employees to
join a union that they may not otherwise choose to join.73 The
agreement, in this case, will be enforced for its term regardless of the
wishes of the employees.7 4
Employees of stable work force employers should be afforded the
protection of their freedom of choice of a bargaining representative by
a requirement that a union may represent them only after certifica-
tion or recognition in accordance with the law governing other indus-
tries. The Board, therefore, should deny stable work force employers
the privilege of section 8(f) protection.
II. BoARD APPLICATION OF THE FINAL PROVISO
IN THE PROJECT-BY-PRoJECT WORK SE'TING
The type of hiring system that Congress envisioned when it passed
section 8(f) is that utilized by the project-by-project employer. 75 An
employer is characterized as a project-by-project employer when he
employs a skeleton force of employees between projects and hires the
bulk of his work force only for the duration of a project.70 Rather
than bargain anew for each project undertaken, the employer signs an
agreement for a term that spans several projects.77
70. Id. at 169-70. The Ninth Circuit denied enforcement, ruling that Board
precedent specified that a showing of one-time majority status created only a rebutt-
able presumption of continued majority status. Precision Striping v. NLRB, 642 F.2d
1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. See 245 N.L.R.B. at 169.
72. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 45.
76. Corrugated Structures, Inc., 2952 N.L.R.B. 523, 524 (19S0) (out of '38 differ-
ent employees . . . .[flour were employed for over a year, six for only a day, and a
majority of the remainder for less than 2 months"): Haberman Constr. Co., 236
N.L.R.B. 79, 84 (1978) (" '[w]hen they'd give me a building to build then I'd get on
the telephone, and I'd usually get my old crew back' " (quoting hearing testimony)):
Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 421 (1977) (the employer "did not
maintain a regular complement of employees, but hired workmen as the need
arose").
77. See sources cited supra note 7. The legislative history of § 8(f) indicates that
"[i]n the building and construction industry it is customary for employers to enter
into collective bargaining agreements for periods of time running into the future,
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At any time during the term of the agreement, the employees or a
rival union may petition the Board to decertify the hiring hall union
pursuant to the final proviso, 78 and upon demonstrating that the
union does not have majority support among the employer's employ-
ees, terminate the obligations under the agreement. 79  The Board's
application of the final proviso goes far beyond its express language
because even absent the filing of a petition for decertification, the
Board will refuse to enforce a pre-hire agreement against an employer
who has repudiated an agreement unless the union can prove majority
support among the employer's employees at the time of the employer's
repudiation.80 Employers have repudiated pre-hire agreements when
cheaper, non-union labor is available and acceptable to the general
contractor"' of a project and when the union with which he has
contracted is not compatible with the union representing the general
perhaps 1 year or in many instances as much as 3 years. Since the vast majority of
building projects are of relatively short duration, such labor agreements necessarily
apply to jobs which have not been started and may not even be contemplated." S.
Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2318, 2344.
78. NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978) ("The employer and its employees-and
the union itself for that matter-may call for a bargaining representative election at
any time."); 105 Cong. Rec. 19,774 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 1860 ("A prehire agreement . . .shall not be a bar to a petition for an
NLRB election filed pursuant to [the final proviso]-this means a petition filed by an
employer, by employees, or by a labor union.").
79. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754, 757 (7th
Cir. 1963) ("[a]ny right ... which the plaintiff unions secured by virtue of their
contracts, ceased and became inoperative on decertification"); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1954) ("[i]t
follows that [after decertification, the union] had no rights under the collective
bargaining agreement"); Sanford Teachers Ass'n v. Sanford School Comm., 409 A. 2d
244, 246 (Me. 1979) ("[b]y virtue of the decertification election [an order to bargain
in good faith] could no longer be granted").
80. D'Angelo & Khan, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 396, 397 (1980); G.M. Masonry Co.,
245 N.L.R.B. 267, 271 (1979); Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421,
421-22 (1977); R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694-95 (1971), enjorce-
ment denied sub nom. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480
F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978). If an employer
refuses to abide by an ordinary collective bargaining agreement, he is guilty of the
unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see, e.g., Cain's Generator &
Armature Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1198, 1201-02 (1978), enJorced, 628 F.2d 933 (1980);
Houston Distrib. Serv., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 960, 969 (1977), enforced, 573 F.2d 260
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 421 (1977);
Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
216 N.L.R.B. 45, 45 (1975), enforcement denied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
1028 (Vol. 50
1982] PRE-HIRE AGREEMENTS 1029
contractor's other employees.82 Because the union will not have ma-
jority status until the employer has actually hired employees from the
hiring hall,8 3 the project-by-project employer may, under the Board's
application of the final proviso, repudiate the pre-hire agreement
with impunity for projects not yet underway. 84 This leaves repudia-
82. See Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 701-02 (1971).
83. Hageman Underground Constr. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 60, 62 n.7 (1980)
("[When] a construction industry employer has no stable complement [of employees]
and hires its employees on a project-by-project basis ... majority status among
employees at a given jobsite is not presumed to carry over automatically to future
sites and 'the union must demonstrate its majority status at each new jobsite in order
to invoke the provisions of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.*" (footnote omitted) (quoting
Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc. 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 422 (1977))): see NLRB v. Haber-
man Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 366-68 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. G.M. Masonry Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 267, 271 (1979): Dee Cee Floor Covering,
Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 422 (1977); Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 46 (1975). enforcement
denied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 335 (1978). In Local Union
No. 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, a project-by-project employer entered into a pre-hire agreement and, in essence,
repudiated it at the beginning of a new project. Id. at 45. The union picketed for a
period of over thirty days. Id. at 46. The Board found that the employer was entitled
to ignore the pre-hire agreement because at the time of repudiation, between proj-
ects, the union did not have majority status. Id. The Board characterized the union's
picketing as calling for recognition of the union rather than enforcement of the pre-
hire agreement. Because recognitional picketing for over thirty days constitutes an
unfair labor practice, the union was found guilty. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denied enforcement of the Board order on the grounds
that the union was picketing for enforcement of the pre-hire agreement, not for
recognition, and that the Board rule of allowing repudiation of the pre-hire agree-
ment between projects would render § 8(f) meaningless. 535 F.2d at 190. The
Supreme Court reviewed the issue of the unfair labor practice of extended picketing
by the union and reversed the circuit court. 434 U.S. at 352. The Court held that the
union was guilty of proscribed picketing based on the Board's construction of § 8(f).
Id. at 341. The Court stated, however, that the Board's interpretation, while not
unreasonable, was not the only tenable construction. Id. Several courts in subsequent
decisions enforcing pre-hire agreements have limited the Supreme Court's decision to
a prohibition to strike for over thirty days to enforce a pre-hire agreement and have
required the employer to contribute to employee benefits funds, as agreed to in the
pre-hire agreement, despite the lack of majority status at the time of the employer's
repudiation. Contractors Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638
F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 1981); Trustees of the Atlanta Iron Workers Local 387
Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097, 1103-04 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Eastern Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Blake Constr. Co.,
457 F. Supp. 825, 829 (E.D. Va. 1978); Western Wash. Cement Masons Health &
Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 230, 612 P.2d 436, 440
(1980). Contra Wash. Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F.
Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1980); Trust Fund v. McDowell, 103 L.R.R.M. 2219 (D.D.C.
1979). Chairman Fanning noted in a concurring opinion in D'Angelo & Khan, Inc.,
248 N.L.R.B. 396 (1980), that the Supreme Court's language in Iron Workers indi-
cates "that a different statutory construction is ... tenable and within the Board's
competence." Id. at 398 (Member Fanning, concurring).
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tion by the project-by-project employer unremedied and effectively
defenestrates the industrial stability that Congress sought by enact-
ment of section 8(f).5
It is important to the construction industry's work referral system
that hiring hall unions and employers enter into pre-hire agreements
that endure beyond the current project. 8° The efficacy of the hiring
hall as a supplier of labor is enhanced when demand for labor is
stabilized by exclusive referral agreements with employers. 87 Allow-
ing repudiation at the whim of the employer can only serve to disrupt
the system. Furthermore, easy repudiation is a two-edged sword that
can be disadvantageous to the employer. Project-by-project employ-
ers, when preparing their bids to general contractors, will base their
estimates of labor costs on the wages and benefits agreed to in their
pre-hire agreements with unions.8 8 Under the current Board applica-
tion of the final proviso, the union could refuse to send workers to the
job, repudiating the agreement with the employer, because prior to
actual hiring the employer's work force will not be comprised of a
majority of union members.89 The union, at least theoretically, will
be in a position to demand extortionate increases in previously agreed
to wages and benefits from the employer.9 0 One of the principal
reasons for the passage of section 8(f) was Congress's recognition that
"it is necessary for the employer to know his labor costs before making
85. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("we cannot conceive of such an exercise in futility on the part of
Congress as to validate a contract with a union having minority status, but to permit
its abrogation because of the union's minority status"); R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 696 (1971) (Members Fanning and Brown, dissenting) ("We find it
impossible to perceive how this statutory objective [of industrial peace and stability]
is served if collective-bargaining agreements lawfully entered into may be terminated
or modified during their term at the whim of either party."), enforcement denied sub
nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973); King & LaVaute, supra note 38, at 940 ("The doctrine expressed by the Board
* . . obviously is disruptive of stable relationships.").
86. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 48.
88. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2344-45; 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 1577.
89. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
90. The majority rule is that once the general contractor has relied upon a
reasonable bid by a sub-contractor, it becomes irrevocable. J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
The Law of Contracts § 6.9, at 212-13 (2d ed. 1977); see, e.g., Litterio & Co. v.
Glassman Constr., 319 F.2d 736, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Reynolds v. Texarkana
Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 584, 374 S.W.2d 818, 819-20 (1964); Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 411, 333 P.2d 757, 760 (1958). For examples of hiring
hall ul)ions pressuring employers by withholding workers, see V.M. Constr., 241
N.L.R.B. 584, 586 (1979); Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 45 (1975), enforcement denied. 535
F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
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the estimate upon which his bid will be based."91 Clearly, Congress
intended that pre-hire agreements should be enforceable prior to ac-
tual hiring.
The difference between the express terms of the final proviso,
which permits a petition by the employees or a rival union, and the
Board rule, which allows lack of union majority as a prospective
defense to an employer that has repudiated a pre-hire agreement, is in
the interests they serve. The petition tests the employees' predilections
and protects their freedom of choice; -92 the defense relieves the em-
ployer and union of their obligations under the contract by empower-
ing them to unilaterally terminate it during the inevitable hiatus
between projects when those hired from the hiring hall have been laid
off. 93
The proper construction of the final proviso necessarily involves a
balancing of the needs of the construction industry with the right of
the employee to select a collective bargaining agent. 4  Statutory
provisos are designed to operate as a restriction of a "dominant body"
of law contained in a statute and should be limited to their express
language. 95  The "dominant body" of section 8(f), which sanctions
agreements between construction industry employers and unions be-
fore the union has attained majority status, reflects the policy that
pre-hire agreements enhance industrial stability and that unions that
enter pre-hire agreements on behalf of employees referred from hiring
halls may be presumed to enjoy majority support among those eventu-
ally hired under the agreement. 9 In the project-by-project employ-
ment setting, there is little potential of adverse effect upon employee
freedom of choice resulting from a pre-hire agreement, and adequate
means of vindicating employee rights through the filing of a petition
as expressly prescribed by the final proviso.9 7 The Board's application
of the final proviso is an anachronism that leaves the principals of the
industry with agreements that are unenforceable in the critical pre-
hire stage. Having to renegotiate terms and conditions of employment
for every construction project has been recognized as "manifestly
inefficient." ' 8 The Board should reconsider its stance and enforce
pre-hire agreements for their term, in accordance with the agreement
and expectations of the parties.
91. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2318, 2345; 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 2, at 1577.
92. See sources cited supra note 31.
93. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
95. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.08, at
82-83 (4th ed. 1973).
96. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
98. 105 Cong. Rec. 15,541 (1959), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note
2, at 1578.
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CONCLUSION
The Board's construction of section 8(f) has met internal dissent and
its application has been resisted by federal courts. The Board should
change its treatment of section 8(f) to conform to legislative history
and the needs of the construction industry by striking a proper balance
between the policies of industrial stability and the freedom of workers
to select their own bargaining representative.
Richard Murphy
